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I. THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE
The typical state administrative agency' performs both legisla-
tive and judicial functions: a legislative role in adopting substantive
regulations, 2 and a judicial role in applying predetermined legal obli-
gations, established either by statute or regulation, to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to a specific party. This dual role necessitates
the use of an informed discretion on the part of the judiciary to ensure
that judicial supervision of administrative actions is appropriate to
the nature of the function being exercised by the agency. Inherent in
the typical administrative program are competing interests in, on the
one hand, minimizing collateral attacks on regulations in administra-
tive or judicial actions to enforce them, and, on the other hand,
ensuring adequate procedures for redress from abuses of the adminis-
trative agencies' legislative powers. In addition, determinations of
legislative policy by an administrative agency deserve greater defer-
ence from the judiciary than the agency's adjudicatory determina-
tions of law and facts.' The proper accommodation of these interests
lies in adequate pre-enforcement judicial review4 of the adoption of
administrative regulations.
The interest in minimizing collateral attacks on the facial valid-
ity of a regulation is explained by the nature and purposes of the rule-
making power. Regulations, to the extent they are consistent with the
statutes enabling their adoption, constitute law that is judicially en-
* Member of the Ohio Bar; formerly Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio, Environ-
mental Law Section.
** Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio, Environmental Law Section.
The scope of this article is limited to judicial review of rule-making decisions by state
administrative agencies. A listing of Ohio administrative agencies with power to adopt rules is
set forth at the end of the pocket part to Title I, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1975).
" The term "regulation" as used in this article is synonymous with the definition of a
"rule" in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(C) (Page Supp. 1975):
"Rule" means any rule, regulation, or standard, having a general and uniform
operation, adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency under the authority
of the laws governing such agency, but it does not include regulations concerning
internal management of the agency which do not affect private rights.
See 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 781 (1965).
As used in this article, the term "pre-enforcement judicial review" means a judicial
determination of the validity of the promulgation of a regulation prior to administrative or
judicial litigation to implement it.
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forceable in the same manner as statutes.' Unlike statutes, however,
regulations are an indispensable step between inchoate legislative
guidelines and a concrete definition of standards of conduct that can
be judicially enforced. They serve to fill in the details of more general
statutory objectives, taking advantage of expertise in a relatively
narrow problem area which the legislature cannot provide. Regula-
tions express specific administrative policy choices, and provide ad-
vance notice of obligations to regulated parties. They limit agency
discretion in implementing broadly defined statutory goals, thereby
promoting uniformity and predictability of administrative decisions.
Most significantly, regulations are the product of a procedure that,
unlike adjudicatory procedure, exposes the agency's assumptions and
policies for accomplishing statutory goals to public scrutiny, debate,
and criticism. Adjudicatory procedure is antithetical to rule-making
procedure in its preoccupation with resolving private controversies
rather than formulating public policy.
Collateral attack on the facial validity of a regulation in private
litigation, if not minimized, might undermine these beneficial
attributes of rule-making procedure. Collateral challenges reach the
courts in appeals from administrative adjudicatory orders entered
either in specific applications of the regulations or in defense of civil
or criminal charges brought for violations. Employment of these pro-
cedures to invoke judicial examination of the agency's rule-making
action-as opposed to judicial examination of the regulation as
applied-creates substantial and unnecessary difficulties for both the
regulator and the regulated party. The court in these cases does not
have before it the record of rule-making proceedings. Even if this
record could be made available, the agency should not be forced to
defend its legislative decisions in every adjudicatory proceeding that
implements them, since this would be contrary to the legislative
purpose in conferring substantive rule-making power upon the
agency, and would reduce regulations to mere guidelines vulnerable
to ad hoc exceptions. Nor should the rule-making action be vulnera-
ble to judicial rejection on the basis of its application to a particular
party, since its application to most other regulated parties might be
wholly defensible. Regulated parties are also injured by the collateral
attack approach; the opportunity for judicial determination of a regu-
lation's validity should not arise only upon violation of the regulation
and the attendant risk of sanctions.
Pre-enforcement judicial review of the adoption of regulations,
See, e.g., Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 120, 77 N.E.2d 921
(1948).
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in contrast to more traditional forms of litigation, is a far more
appropriate procedure to redress administrative abuses of the rule-
making power. Possible means of obtaining review are the declara-
tory judgment action and direct statutory appeal from the adminis-
trative rule-making order. The direct statutory appeal remedy, how-
ever, has been virtually foreclosed by the Ohio Supreme Court.6 The
declaratory judgment procedure, on the other hand, has recently re-
ceived a lukewarm endorsement by the court. 7
This article will attempt to demonstrate that the declaratory
judgment procedure is not an adequate substitute for direct appeal,
and that the availability of direct judicial review of rule-making or-
ders is of major importance to both governmental and private inter-
ests.
II. THE DEMISE OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE PROMULGATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Since 1942 the Ohio Supreme Court has, with few exceptions,
disallowed judicial appellate review of the promulgation of adminis-
trative regulations. This deprivation of prompt appellate review,
which would serve both the efficiency of the administrative programs
and the protection of regulated parties from unlawful regulations, has
been accomplished through a line of cases characterized by unper-
suasive and often inconsistent reasoning.
A. Zangerle v. Evatt
The Ohio Supreme Court began its struggle with the propriety
of judicial review of the promulgation of administrative regulations
in Zangerle v. Evatt.8 The case arose upon appeal of rule no. 2 to the
Board of Tax Appeals by several county auditors. The rule as
adopted by the Tax Commissioner reclassified oil refinery structures
from real to personal property, thus lowering the valuation of such
property for tax purposes. Upon the Board's affirmance of the law-
fulness of rule no. 2, two county auditors appealed to the Ohio Su-
preme Court.9 In a lengthy opinion, the court declined to review the
See Section II infra.
See Section III infra.
139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942). Further discussion of Zangerle and its progeny
may be found in Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34 Orno ST. L.J.
853 (1973), and Rutledge, Administrative Review and the Ohio Modern Courts Amendment,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1974).
General Code § 5611-2 (Page 1945) provided in pertinent part:
The proceeding to obtain . . . reversal, vacation, or modification shall be by
appeal to the supreme court of Ohio.
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Board's decision, and sua sponte dismissed the appeals. It cited three
different grounds for denying judicial review of the regulation, and
its reasoning on each is unpersuasive.
One basis for dismissal was the lack of a justiciable question.
The court held that the lawfulness of a regulation may be challenged
only in the context of the application of the regulation to a specific
set of facts developed in an adjudicatory context.'0 It failed to recog-
nize that there may bejusticiable issues other than the proper applica-
tion of the regulation to specific parties, such as infringement of
constitutional guarantees, conflict with or extension beyond the ena-
bling legislation, lack of minimally required rationality, or proce-
dural errors in the promulgation of the regulation, which are appar-
ent on the face of the regulation.
Another ground for dismissal was the absence as parties of the
oil companies whose property was reclassified by the rule. The court
concluded that the auditors lacked sufficient standing to present the
issue in concrete terms,"1 and that to determine the validity of the rule
in the absence of the oil companies would result in an advisory opin-
ion binding on no one." The court erroneously overlooked the fact
that the auditors were within the class of persons authorized by stat-
ute to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals and then to the supreme
court; 3 and the auditors, as representatives of their respective politi-
cal subdivisions, had a strong financial interest in a successful chal-
lenge to the rule. Because the requisite adversity of interests existed
without the presence as parties of the oil companies, 4 their absence
should not have defeated the auditors' sole remedy against a regula-
tion that reduced revenues. 5
The court's third and most troublesome basis for refusing to
review the rule has caused significant difficulties in later actions
Appeals from decisions of the board of tax appeals determining appeals from
final determinations by the tax commissioner . . . may be instituted . . . by the
county auditor ...
Act of April 3, 1941, § 1, 117 Ohio Laws 34.
1o 139 Ohio St. at 571, 41 N.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 578, 41 N.E.2d at 376.
H2 Id. at 574, 41 N.E.2d at 374.
'3 See note 9 supra.
'1 A fundamental reason for the judicial rule against rendering advisory opinions is that
the absence of an aggrieved party to zealously prepare and adequately litigate the factual and
legal issues detracts from the quality of the court's decision-making process. See United States
v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
'1 The effect of the court's ruling is to instruct persons benefited by a regulation to abstain
from intervening to defend it in an appellate challenge, thus defeating such an appeal. The oil
companies, presumably, could have intervened before the Board of Tax Appeals and the su-
preme court, although this opportunity was neither addressed nor recognized in the court's
opinion.
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seeking pre-enforcement judicial review of regulations. The Ohio con-
stitution grants the court "such revisory jurisdiction of the proceed-
ings of administrative officers as may be conferred by law."'" The
court interpreted the term "proceedings" to include only "quasi-
judicial" proceedings, and to exclude "quasi-legislative" proceedings
such as the promulgation of regulations. It felt bound, therefore, to
narrowly interpret the statute granting it appellate jurisdiction 7 as
authorizing review of quasi-judicial orders only. By this constitu-
tional interpretation of the scope of its appellate jurisdiction over the
activities of administrative agencies, the court constructed a jurisdic-
tional bar to any supreme court review of rule making.
The court's rationale for its interpretation of "proceedings" is
wholly unpersuasive. It relied heavily on definitions of the term as
employed in relation to trial courts. Of course, these tribunals per-
form only an adjudicatory function, and do not represent a proper
analogy to the dual legislative and judicial role performed by admin-
istrative agencies. The court cited but did not follow broader defini-
tions of "proceedings" which indicate that the term encompasses all
activities appropriate to the body to which it is applied."8 Further-
more, it did not consider the record of the debates of the constitu-
tional convention, at which the term "proceedings" was chosen; there
is no indication that the framers intended a distinction between quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial orders, and indeed there is evidence to
the contrary."
The court also failed to provide definitions for the terms "quasi-
judicial" and "quasi-legislative," which are needed to construct a
distinction of constitutional import. This failure is compounded in
later cases in which the court struggled unsuccessfully to adopt con-
sistent and workable definitions."0 Moreover, to make legal rights
turn upon these labels places too great an emphasis on the procedural
distinction between rule making and adjudication, for substantive
administrative decisions may be imposed through either procedure. 2'
OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(c).
I? See note 9 supra.
' 139 Ohio St. at 570, 41 N.E.2d at 372.
' 2 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 1118 (1913).
20 See, e.g., M.J. Kelley Co. v. City of Cleveland, 32 Ohio St. 2d 150, 290 N.E.2d 562
(1972); Haught v. City of Dayton, 34 Ohio St. 2d 32, 295 N.E.2d 404 (1973). DeLong v. Board
of Educ., 36 Ohio St. 2d 62, 303 N.E.2d 890 (1973).
Kelley, Haught and DeLong discredit the quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial distinction, for
in each the court foreclosed judicial review on grounds unrelated to the substance of the
administrative order, and left unclear the types of orders over which the court would exercise
jurisdiction.
21 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01 (1958); Rutledge, Administrative
Review and the Ohio Modern Courts Amendment, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 52 (1974).
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In sum, the court's determination that a matter as fundamentally
important as appellate jurisdiction rests upon a superficial distinction
between "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" administrative or-
ders is lamentable and ultimately unworkable.
Whatever the shortcomings of the court's reasoning in Zangerle,
that case established the supreme court's strong disfavor of appellate
review of the adoption of administrative regulations. With only two
exceptions, 2  later appeals from the adoption of regulations reached
the same result. Although the reasoning in each is not wholly consis-
tent, these cases incorporate and preserve the errors of Zangerle.
B. Craun Transportation, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission
Craun Transportation, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission'
was the next attempt to obtain appellate review of the adoption of
administrative regulations that reached the supreme court. The Com-
mission adopted an order that set out regulations for motor transpor-
tation freight carriers. The carriers appealed to the supreme court,
contending that the regulations were violative of the Ohio and fede-
ral constitutions. The court dismissed sua sponte on the sole ground
that the adoption of a regulation, unlike the application of a regula-
tion to a specific set of facts, does not present a justiciable question,24
thus preserving the branch of Zangerle which failed to recognize the
possibility of well defined issues on the face of regulations. The court
thus required the carriers to violate the regulations and face severe
sanctions before it would afford them an opportunity to vindicate
their claimed constitutional rights. Its holding significantly impaired
the carriers' ability to challenge unlawful regulations.
C. Morgan County Budget Commission v. Board of Tax Appeals
The court returned to the jurisdictional holding of Zangerle in
Morgan County Budget Commission v. Board of Tax Appeals.2 5 In
this case, the Board was petitioned by the Ohio Power Company to
review the budget for Morgan County adopted by the Budget Com-
mission. To determine reviewability of the Board's order, the court
departed from the justiciability analysis in Craun and invoked that
portion of Zangerle which limited appellate jurisdiction of the court
to "quasi-judicial" administrative orders. However, it concluded that
I Morgan County Budget Comm. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 225, 193 N.E.2d
145 (1963); Haught v. City of Dayton, 34 Ohio St. 2d 32, 295 N.E.2d 404 (1973).
2 162 Ohio St. 9, 120 N.E.2d 436 (1954).
24 Id. at 10, 120 N.E.2d at 437.
21 175 Ohio St. 225, 193 N.E.2d 145 (1963).
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the appellee's failure to contest jurisdiction required the court to
assume that the order was quasi-judicial and properly before it, in
effect permitting the parties to determine the scope of the court's
appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, while Zangerle provided that the
original order, and not the nature of the Board's review of that order,
governed reviewability, the court in Morgan County strongly indi-
cated that, had it reached the issue, it would have determined review-
ability with reference to the Board's proceedings and resultant
order.26 This uncertainty about what constitutes an appealable order
and about the effect on this determination of the failure to request
dismissal casts further doubt upon the wisdom of the court's jurisdic-
tional holding in Zangerle.
D. Fortner v. Thomas
The two branches of Zangerle affirmed in Craun and Morgan
County reappeared in Fortner v. Thomas.27 Fortner required the
court to examine for the first time the Administrative Procedure
Act,2 which governs the procedure of most state agencies .2 Like the
statutes invoked in earlier appeals, Revised Code § 119.11"0 permit-
ted judicial appellate review of rule making, commencing in the court
of common pleas. In Fortner, the Ohio Liquor Control Commission
had amended a regulation"1 imposing added responsibilities on bar-
keepers, which amendment was appealed by a holder of a liquor
permit to the court of common pleas. Further appeals brought the
action to the supreme court, which held that the court of common
pleas should have dismissed. It quoted extensively from Zangerle in
holding that a justiciable question is presented only upon the specific
application of a regulation, and held that the amended regulation had
not been applied to the appellant, thus foreclosing judicial review. As
26 Id. at 227 n.2, 193 N.E.2d at 146 n.2.
22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1969).
2' The procedures for appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals and the Public Utilities
Commission are governed by separate statutes specifically applicable to each agency. OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 5717.04 (Page 1973) (Board of Tax Appeals); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4903.12 (Page 1954) (Public Utilities Commission).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969) provided in pertinent part:
Any person adversely affected by an order of an agency in adopting, amending, or
rescinding a rule or adopting, readopting, or continuing a rule, amendment, or
rescission previously adopted as an emergency rule as provided in Section 119.03 of
the Revised Code, may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin county on
the ground that said agency failed to comply with the law in adopting, amending,
rescinding, publishing, or distributing said rule, or that the rule as adopted or
amended by the agency is unreasonable or unlawful, or that the rescission of the rule
was unreasonable or unlawful.
21 Ohio Liquor Control Commission Reg. LCc-I-52.
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in both Zangerle and Craun, the facts of Fortner belie the court's
conclusion that the regulation had not yet been applied to the appel-
lant. The amendment had the effect of immediately imposing upon
the permit holder responsibility for any employee who allowed "im-
proper conduct" on the licensed premises. Violation placed the per-
mit holder in jeopardy of revocation. Therefore, the regulated party
was again left without an effective appellate remedy to challenge an
allegedly unlawful regulation.
The principal error of Fortner, however, is its extension to the
courts of common pleas of Zangerle's jurisdictional holding limiting
review to quasi-judicial orders. The grant of jurisdiction to the courts
of common pleas is provided by the recent Modern Courts Amend-
ment to the Ohio constitution: "The courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof shall have. . . such powers of review of proceedings
of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law. '3 2
The court reasoned that employment of the term "proceedings" indi-
cated the framers' intent to invoke the interpretation of that term set
forth in Zangerle-again giving this interpretation constitutional
import-and thus rendered ineffective the clear purpose of the Gen-
eral Assembly to provide for prompt judicial review of administrative
regulations. Fortner thus compounded the error of Zangerle by en-
grafting its jurisdictional limitation upon the constitutional definition
of the jurisdiction of yet another court.3
Shortly after it decided Fortner, the court rendered a decision
concerning review of rule making by way of a declaratory judgment
action which raised many questions about the continued vitality of
Zangerle and its progeny. It is to that decision which the discussion
now turns.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS A SUB-
STITUTE OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW
A. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission 34
On June 16, 1970, the Ohio Liquor Control Commission
adopted regulation LCc-1-73s at the behest of Ohio beer distribu-
32 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B). Prior to the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968, the
courts of common pleas were granted jurisdiction as "fixed by law." OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4
(1851).
3 The holding regarding Revised Code § 119.11 is surprising in that the court refrained
from finding the section unconstitutional. The court presumably felt the statute performed a
function other than providing for appellate review of rule making. The language of the section,
however, indicates no other purpose; Justice Duncan urged a holding of unconstitutionality for
this very reason in his concurring opinion. His view was adopted, and the statute finally
declared invalid, in Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St. 2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686
(1975). See Section V.A. infra.
34 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
" The enabling authority upon which this regulation was predicated is set forth in Revised
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tors. It involved a complex set of controls over price changes initiated
by breweries and wholesale distributors. The apparent purpose of the
regulation was to avoid anticompetitive pricing, but the regulation
had the practical effect of increasing the marketing autonomy of
wholesalers. Shortly after the adoption of regulation LCc-1-73, and
prior to any attempt to enforce it, nine brewing companies licensed
and regulated by the Commission challenged its validity by filing suit
in the court of common pleas for Franklin County. The complaint
requested that the court determine whether Revised Code § 119.11 or
§ 119.12 was the proper appellate procedure to protect plaintiffs'
rights against allegedly unlawful rule-making action. Should the
court determine that no appeal was open under either section, the
complaint alternatively requested a declaratory judgment 6 that the
regulation was invalid.
The brewers' complaint skillfully capitalized on the defects in the
logic of Fortner. In addition to alleging that there had been proce-
dural errors in the regulation's adoption," and that the Commission
lacked statutory authority to promulgate such price regulations, 3
the complaint alleged infringement of five separate constitutional
rights. The complaint's most crucial element was the allegation that
the regulation threatened the breweries' multimillion dollar in-
vestment and the jobs and welfare of the breweries' employees since
one of the sanctions for its violation was revocation of the brewers'
permits. The brewers contended that if Fortner were interpreted as
holding that there can be no judicial review of the adoption of rules
and regulations by quasi-legislative action of administrative agencies,
then administrative rule-making power was a deprivation of due pro-
cess and equal protection under both the Ohio and federal constitu-
tions. How could the courts require that the regulation be violated,
at the risk of such a severe sanction, before the brewers had the
Code chapters 4301 and 4303. The procedure applicable to the adoption of this regulation is
set forth in Revised Code § 119.03.
2' Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Page 1954) provides:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constitut-
ing a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in § 119.01 of the Revised Code,
municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under such instrument, constitutional provision, stat-
ute, rule, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder.
The complaint alleged that no "order" was made by the Commission in adopting the
regulation, as required by Revised Code § 119.03(D), and that no "effective date" was desig-
nated for the regulation, as required by § 119.04(A)(3).
11 The complaint alleged that such price regulations were expressly prohibited by Revised
Code § 4301.041 and 4301.05.
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opportunity to vindicate the substantial statutory and constitutional
rights alleged?39 But on the other hand, how could the brewers'
attempt to obtain judicial review of administrative rule-making ac-
tion in the absence of "quasi-judicial" proceedings overcome the ju-
risdictional barriers declared by Zangerle and Fortner? Counsel for
the brewers had bluntly placed the courts on the "horns of a di-
lemma"4 not unlike that suffered by their clients.
The Ohio Supreme Court found Fortner dispositive on the issue
of appeal under Revised Code § 119.1 1,11 but went on to find that the
declaratory judgment action was an available remedy and was not
precluded by Fortner. The first paragraph of the syllabus stated:
An action for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity
of an administrative agency regulation may be entertained by a
court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, where the action is
within the spirit of the Declaratory Judgment Act, a justiciable
controversy exists between adverse parties, and speedy relief is nec-
essary to the preservation of rights which may otherwise be im-
paired or lost.4
The significant element of the Burger Brewing decision is para-
graph two of the syllabus, which raised many more questions than it
resolved. It distinguished Fortner as follows: "Where the prerequis-
ites for entertaining such an action are met, an action for a declara-
tory judgment upon the validity of an administrative agency regula-
tion does not constitute a judicial review of quasi-legislative proceed-
ings of such agency."43 The court's opinion set forth several prere-
quisites to the availability of the declaratory judgment remedy, rely-
ing upon American Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Jones" to
define the three elements necessary to action: (1) a real controversy
between the parties, (2) which is justiciable in character, and (3)
speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.
As to the requirement of a "real controversy," the court cited
31 It certainly would be anomalous to allow the legislature to avoid judicial review of
legislative action by transferring the legislative power to an administrative agency rather than
directly exercising it. Had regulation LCc-1-73 been enacted as a statute by the legislature, its
constitutionality could have been tested under Revised Code § 2721.03. See note 36 supra.
" 34 Ohio St. 2d at 99, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
, Id. at 95-96, 296 N.E.2d at 263.
12 Id. at 93, 296 N.E.2d at 262.
11 Id. The court in Former did not state or imply that exclusion from the "quasi-
legislative" category ensures reviewability; it held only that inclusion in the category of "quasi-
judicial proceedings" is a prerequisite of appeal under article IV, § 4(B).
" 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
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Peltz v. South Euclid 5 as holding that the action must be "between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."4 The
court concluded that the facts of Burger Brewing met this "real con-
troversy" test:
On one side of the controversy are the manufacturers seeking
a judgment declaring the regulation void in order to avoid its eco-
nomic constraints; on the opposite side are the wholesalers, invok-
ing the regulation to set a ratio of the price charged them and the
retailers."
Conspicuously absent from the court's analysis is the interest of the
state, represented by the Liquor Control Commission."'
The court relied upon the two-fold test in Toilet Goods
Association v. Gardner" to supply the details of the "justiciability"
requirement, stating that it was necessary "first to determine whether
the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution, and second
to assess the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at that
stage.""0 The facts in Burger Brewing considered by the court as
satisfying the "appropriate for judicial resolution" criterion were
briefly and ambiguously described:
Hearings were held, and briefs were submitted before the commis-
sion drafted the regulation in its present form. The regulation was
promulgated and became effective in August 1970.
There is sufficient information in the record upon which this
court can base its decision. The regulation need not be violated to
present a justiciable controversy because the regulation itself essen-
tially involves legal questions. We are not asked to adjudicate rights
and obligations in a "vacuum" which was decried by this court in
Fortner v. Thomas. .... 51
The second branch of the Toilet Goods "justiciability" formula was
also found to be satisfied in Burger Brewing:
Regulation LCc-1-73 is self executing. There is no enabling
legislation necessary to give it validity; nor is there any other agency
II Ohio St. 2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
" 34 Ohio St. 2d at 97, 296 N.E.2d at 264.
17 Id.
11 The court's emphasis on the presence of the wholesalers creates doubt as to whether
there would have been a "real controversy" if the wholesalers had not intervened as defendants.
This brings to mind the court's emphasis in Zangerle on the absence of the oil companies whose
property was reclassified. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
387 U.S. 158 (1967).
"' 34 Ohio St. 2d at 97, 296 N.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 97-98, 296 N.E.2d at 264-65 (citation omitted).
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involved in the enforcement of the regulation, at whose discretion
the regulation could be enforced or ignored; for the Liquor Control
Commission has its own enforcement division.
The regulation has a present and direct effect on the personal
rights of the plaintiffs. 2
Finally the court concluded that "speedy relief" was indeed nec-
essary in the Burger Brewing case:
Regulation LCc-1-73, on its face, specifically regulates the
plaintiffs' businesses-their pricing and marketing systems. There
is no aspect of their businesses that is more crucial to success than
pricing and marketing.
In order for plaintiffs to comply with the regulations, they must
change the methods that have been traditionally used in pric-
ing . ..
Since the plaintiffs are convinced that the regulation is invalid,
they are placed in a perplexing dilemma: Either change their cus-
tomary pricing and marketing procedures in order to conform with
the regulation, or challenge the regulation by disobedience and face
severe sanctions. 53
One can see that the Burger Brewing opinion gives the practitioner
little guidance on when a declaratory judgment action is available to
determine the validity of an administrative regulation.
B. The Incongruity of Burger Brewing and Fortner
Burger Brewing held that a declaratory judgment action is a
permissible procedure to determine the validity of an administrative
regulation, although a direct appeal under Revised Code § 119.11 is
not. The court failed to demonstrate how the declaratory judgment
procedure it sanctioned differed from the direct appeal procedure it
foreclosed.
The reaffirmance of Fortner in Burger Brewing was ambiguous
about which principle was being reaffirmed. The opinion merely con-
cluded that "In Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, this
court had before it a Liquor Control Commission regulation. It held
that such a regulation could not be reviewed under R.C. 119.11. Thus
Fortner is dispositive of the appeal in this case under R.C. 119.11
."' The remainder of the Burger Brewing opinion is inconsist-
52 Id. at 98, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
3 Id. at 98-99, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
1 Id. at 96, 296 N.E.2d at 263.
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ent with both branches of Fortner, for Burger Brewing concluded that
"quasi-judicial" proceedings are not a condition precedent to juris-
diction, and that attempts to challenge the validity of administrative
regulations are not per se nonjusticiable 5
The court's reasons for approving the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure were also unclear. The court seemed to be struggling to pro-
vide what it perceived to be a necessary remedy without overruling
Fortner.6 The three reasons presented in Burger Brewing for giving
effect to Revised Code § 2721.03 would, however, also support a
decision to give effect to Revised Code § 119.11. First, the court
recognized that Revised Code § 2721.03 unequivocally conferred a
judicial remedy to determine the validity of a regulation.', The direct
appeal sought in Fortner stands on the same footing, since Revised
Code § 119.11 demonstrates with even greater clarity the legislative
intent to create a means for obtaining judicial review of a regulation.
Second, the court observed in Burger Brewing that "[tihere is suffi-
cient information in the record upon which this court can base its
decision." ' Revised Code §§ 119.03 and 119.11, by comparison, as-
sure the presentation of a complete record of rule-making proceed-
ings to the reviewing court. Should the rule-making record prove
inadequate, the reviewing court should hold the agency accountable
rather than foreclose the appellant from redress. Finally, the court
considered the potential sanctions for violation of the regula-
tion-revocation of appellants' liquor permits-as constituting a
"threat of irreparable injury." 9 Under this test, any regulation that
could be enforced by license revocation would threaten regulated
parties with "irreparable injury." It is not clear from Burger Brewing
whether the severity of the potential sanction alone determines
whether "irreparable injury" exists. It is clear, however, that the
concept of "irreparable injury" as used in Burger Brewing is suffi-
ciently close to the requirement in Revised Code § 119.11 that an
appellant be "adversely affected" to eliminate any practical differ-
ence between the two.
After reaffirming Fortner and condoning the declaratory judg-
ment procedure, the Burger Brewing court attempted to distinguish
Fortner. Two separate grounds were given in support of the distinc-
u See section III(A) supra.
" The Burger Brewing opinion implicitly favors the appellants with a presumption that
the remedy sought is proper if Fortner can be distinguished, thereby completely ignoring the
constitutional phraseology that had been construed so unyieldingly to dictate the results reached
in Fortner and Zangerle.
' 34 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 296 N.E.2d at 263-64.
Id. at 98, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
I d. at 99, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
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tion. The reasoning underlying each is wholly unconvincing.
The first ground for distinguishing Fortner appears to be based
upon some unexplained fundamental difference in the "relief
sought":
First, the plaintiffs in Fortner sought review of an administra-
tive regulation under R.C. 119.11. Relief sought in the nature of a
declaratory judgment is distinctly different from the relief sought in
an administrative review. Furthermore, if judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings were necessary before a declaratory judgment could be
granted, an action for such a judgment would be little more than a
substitute for direct appeal. It is the very purpose of declaratory
judgment actions to provide a determination as to the validity of a
statute, ordinance, or agency regulation."0
It is most unfortunate that the court omitted any explanation of its
reason for underscoring "review" or of the "distinct difference" it
saw between "relief sought in the nature of a declaratory judgment"
and "relief sought in an administrative review." It appears that the
relief sought in both cases is identical, as demonstrated by the
brewers' simultaneous filing under Revised Code §§ 119.11 and
2721.03 for the exact same redress.
The third sentence in the statement quoted necessarily implies
that the jurisdiction of courts of common pleas under article IV,
§ 4(B) of the Ohio constitution is not confined to review of "quasi-
judicial" proceedings. However, Fortner's holding to the contrary
was unqualifiedly reaffirmed in Burger Brewing. If it can be inferred
from Burger Brewing that the court realized that its "quasi-
legislative," "quasi-judicial" test for determining jurisdiction was er-
roneous, it is inexcusable that direct appellate review of rule making
was not resurrected.
The court also attempted to distinguish Fortner on factual
grounds:
Second, Fortner is also distinguishable on its facts. There the
court was concerned with "premature declarations or advice upon
potential controversies," and the court decided that this was the
status of Fortner who "had never been directly subjected to the
application of the amended regulation."
Here, plaintiffs are presently subjected to the application of
Regulation LCc-1-73 as heretofore shown. Consequently, a declara-
tory judgment. . . would not constitute mere advice upon a poten-
tial controversy."'
Id. at 99, 296 N.E.2d at 265-66 (citation omitted).
' Id. at 99-100, 296 N.E.2d at 266.
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The court's portrayal of its decision in Fortner was in error, for
the second branch of Fortner held that review of a regulation neces-
sarily fails to present a justiciable question. If justiciability is to be
determined through a case-by-case analysis of the specific facts in-
volved, as Burger Brewing provides, direct appeal of rule making
should not have been defeated by the diametrically opposite premise
that all appeals from "quasi-legislative" administrative actions are
per se nonjusticiable.
In addition, there is absolutely no basis for the conclusion that
Fortner "had never been directly subjected to the application of the
amended regulation" while Burger and the other brewers were "pres-
ently subjected to the application of LCc-1-73. '6 2 Burger and Fortner
were affected in essentially the same manner by the regulations they
challenged, and both faced comparable sanctions, including license
revocation, for violation of the regulations.
However unfortunate and confusing the court's reaffirmance of
Fortner may be, Burger Brewing was clearly a step in the right direc-
tion. Instead of relying upon the "quasi-legislative," "quasi-judicial"
distinction to determine jurisdiction, the court more properly focused
on the presence of standing, ripeness, and justiciability.
IV. THE ADVANTAGE OF DIRECT REVIEW OVER DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS
Burger Brewing seems to reflect the court's recognition that it
had painted itself into a corner by the overbreadth of the conclusion
in the line of cases from Zangerle through Fortner. In refusing to
follow Fortner to its logical conclusion, the court in Burger Brewing
finally accepted the premise that pre-enforcement judicial review of
administrative regulations is both necessary and desirable. 3 The
practical effect of Burger Brewing is to substitute a declaratory judg-
ment action for direct appeal.
Unfortunately, the declaratory judgment procedure for obtain-
ing review has a number of infirmities. Its most serious defect is in
permitting a new and independent trial on the merits 4 rather than
confining review to the administrative record of proceedings upon
which the rule-making decision is based. 5 Normally in the process
42 Id.
3 See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio. 34 011o ST. L.J. 853,
876-77 (1973).
61 In Burger Brewing, for example, the common pleas court held an evidentiary hearing
in which the plaintiffs put on witnesses to testify against the regulation in question.
11 The content of the record of rule-making proceedings for purposes of an appeal under
Revised Code § 119.11 is spelled out in Ohio State Fed'n of Licensed Nursing Homes v. Public
Health Council, 113 Ohio App. 113, 116, 172 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1961):
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of appellate review new allegations of fact and items of proof tend-
ered for the first time on appeal are not permitted. 6 In the context
of judicial review of administrative regulations, the new evidence
presented in a declaratory judgment action directly interferes with the
rule-making function by placing the court in the position of indepen-
dently assessing legislative facts developed in a de novo evidentiary
hearing. By basing its decision upon the evidence presented at trial,
the court necessarily substitutes its judgment for that of the adminis-
trative agency. 7 Moreover, the declaratory judgment procedure fol-
lowed in Burger Brewing is an invitation to regulated parties to with-
hold relevant evidence from the rulemaker in order to gain a tactical
advantage in a subsequent judicial attack on the regulation. Direct
appeal under Revised Code § 119.11, by contrast, limits the reviewing
court to the record adduced on the proposed regulation prior to its
final adoption by the agency. Broad based public participation, which
provides all proponents and opponents of the proposed regulation
with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the agency takes
any final action, is the touchstone of rule-making procedure.
Confinement of pre-enforcement judicial review of a regulation
to the record of the agency's rule-making proceedings has numerous
advantages. It promotes more competent rule making, since the justi-
fication for a regulation must be documented in the record. 8 A pro-
A "record of proceedings" means a record of compliance with all the procedural
requirements of Section 119.03, i.e.: (A) public notice of the proposed rules: (B) filing
with the Secretary of State: (C) notice of public hearing, all written evidence or
exhibits, a transcript of oral testimony and rulings: (D) the order adopting the rule
and the rules adopted and, (E) proof of a reasonable effort to inform affected
persons.
The issue of what constitutes an adequate record for purposes of meaningful judicial review of
administrative rule making involves complexities beyond the scope of this article. It is impor-
tant to recognize here that the adequacy of the rule-making record is of great significance to
the process of review.
6A See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973): F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3, at 525 (1965).
11 A court should not substitute its judgment for that of administrators but rather should
determine whether the administrative action involved was lawful and appropriate on the basis
of the record that was before the administrator. 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
781 (1965).
Meaningful judicial review of a regulation is impossible in the absence of an intelligible
record demonstrating the basis for the agency's decision. Two decisions of Ohio courts of
appeals under Revised Code § 119.11 demonstrate confusion on this point. In re Board of
Liquor Control's Amendments, 115 Ohio App. 243, 245, 184 N.E.2d 767, 768-69 (1961).
followed in Long v. Division of Watercraft. 118 Ohio App. 369, 370, 195 N.E.2d 128. 129
(1963). holds that in rule-making proceedings under Revised Code § 119.03:
The administrative agency has no obligation to support the reasonableness of its
proposal-except in the sense of the practical desirability of rebuttal, especially in
the light of the limitation on evidence on an appeal under Section 119.11, Revised
Code. ...
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per record would demonstrate the specific evidence available to the
agency and the policy considerations upon which the regulation is
predicated. This exposure of the agency's reasoning and policy
choices to public scrutiny is an advantage unique to the administra-
tive rule-making procedure. 9 In contrast, litigation by specific par-
ties, as in a declaratory judgment action, skews the balance of diverse
interests affected by most regulations, and may result in judicial
rejection of a regulation on the basis of its effect upon an isolated
interest. 0 This problem is most severe in relation to the increasingly
common "resource allocation" regulations, where one regulatee's
gain must be offset by a commensurate loss for other regulatees.71
Another disadvantage of the declaratory judgment procedure is
the absence of a time limitation for filing challenges to a regulation.
This impedes the obvious interest of all concerned in a prompt judi-
cial determination of the regulation's facial validity. Belated chal-
lenges may create retroactivity problems if the regulation has been
applied or enforced in a great number of cases.7 2 Moreover, the abil-
[Section 119.111 does not require the court to affirmatively find that the action
is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. It requires only that the
court determine whether the procedure was proper and whether the rule adopted is
reasonable and lawful.
It is difficult to understand how a reviewing court is to determine that a challenged regulation
is "reasonable" unless there is a basis in the record for that conclusion. See the discussion of
these cases in Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34 Oio ST. L.J.
853, 874-75 (1973). In re Bd. of Liquor Control's Amendments and Long misconstrue the
scope of review prescribed by the "reasonable and lawful" test, which is broader than that under
the "substantial evidence" test. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07, at
149 (1958).
" Professor Davis, describing administrative rule-making procedure as "one of the great-
est inventions of modern government," analogizes it to the legislative committee system and
notes its advantages over "retroactive" law making through adjudication. I K. DAVIS, ADIMINIS-
TRATIvE LAW § 6.15, at 283-85 (Supp. 1970).
1, The opportunity for a litigant in a declaratory judgment action to build a de novo record
of facts most favorable to its claims tends to exclude from the court's consideration interests
of nonparty proponents of the regulation. In this respect Burger Brewing is inconsistent with
the sixth paragraph of the Zangerle syllabus: "It is the duty of courts to insist that everything
upon which they are to base an order or judgment must be before them in such a way that no
one to be affected may be deprived of full opportunity to explain or refute such order or
judgment .... " 139 Ohio St. at 563, 41 N.E.2d at 369.
11 Environmental protection standards are good examples of "resource allocation" regula-
tions: the total amount of pollution abatement necessary is a given, but the mix of pollution
abatement measures necessary from each individual contributing source in order to arrive at
that total is variable. OHmO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3704.03(E), 6111.03(J) (Page Supp. 1975).
72 The retroactivity problem is particularly acute for the many licensing programs adminis-
tered by state agencies. It is conceivable that an agency could process thousands of licenses
under a given regulation and thereafter, as a result of a declaratory judgment action, be
apprised that the regulation was ultra vires and void. Presumably, the licenses already processed
would have to be rescinded or modified.
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ity to file a complaint at the plaintiff's convenience means that the
declaratory judgment procedure can easily be used to circumvent and
confuse administrative adjudicatory proceedings.73
The declaratory judgment procedure has other drawbacks. It
undermines the purpose of direct review provisions to provide consis-
tent decisions on the validity of regulations, and invites forum shop-
ping among the eighty-eight different common pleas courts. 74 Fur-
thermore, Burger Brewing is unclear about when a declaratory judg-
ment will lie. It appears that some substantive regulations are poten-
tially reviewable while others are not, for the opinion is replete with
contingencies on the availability of a declaratory judgment. Must the
regulation be "self-executing," 7 and if so, what does that term mean?
Is review unavailable unless the regulation involves "essentially legal
questions" ' 76 as in Burger Brewing? Is it necessary to have adverse
parties other than the agency?77 The likelihood of a consistently avail-
able remedy in meritorious cases is much too remote.
Despite the court's statement in Burger Brewing that a declara-
tory judgment is "distinctly different" from direct appellate review,,
the final decision on the merits in Burger Brewing was in substance
equivalent to a decision on direct appeal, as it constituted judicial
review of the lawfulness of a rule-making decision. The court, after
invalidating a preferable appellate procedure on the basis of faulty
reasoning in Zangerle and Fortner, refused to correct its error and
merely established an unacceptable alternative upon equally infirm
grounds.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Having determined that direct review of the promulgation of
administrative regulations is far superior to actions in declaratory
judgment, the next question is how to construct such a remedy in a
manner acceptable to the Ohio Supreme Court. In its 1975 term, the
73 It is possible that many declaratory judgment actions challenging the validity of a
regulation would be filed on the eve of the agency's attempt to enforce the regulation. The
pendency of such an action might well have a "chilling effect" on the agency's conduct of an
adjudicatory hearing to force compliance with the regulation. There would doubtless be some
instances in which the trial court would stay or enjoin an agency's proceeding to force compli-
ance until the merits of a declaratory judgment action had been decided.
1 A plaintiff may be able to perfect venue in his home county in an action for a declaratory
judgment contesting the validity of a state administrative regulation. See OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(B),
(E).
7 34 Ohio St. 2d at 98, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
, Id. at 98, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
17 Id. at 97, 296 N.E.2d at 264.
11 Id. at 99. 296 N.E.2d at 265.
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court rendered three decisions in appeals from rule-making orders of
state agencies. These decisions warrant close analysis in order to
detect any modification of the court's disapproval of rule-making
appeals.
A. Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell
The first case was a consolidation of two appeals, Rankin-
Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell and American Electric Power Co. v. Chief
of Division of Forestry and Reclamation.79 Both involved appeals
from rule-making orders of state agencies to the court of common
pleas pursuant to Revised Code § 119.11.11 Speculation that the court
had granted certiorari to reconsider Fortner was proven inaccurate,
for in the first paragraph of its opinion the court reaffirmed the
holding of Fortner and Burger Brewing that Revised Code § 119.11
cannot be used to obtain appellate review of administrative rule mak-
ing.
Having quickly -affirmed the dismissals below, the court ad-
dressed two loose ends left by previous cases. First, it accepted the
conclusion of the concurring opinion in Fortner that the court should
flatly declare Revised Code § 119.11 unconstitutional. Second, it ad-
dressed the issue of what constitutes an appealable quasi-judicial
administrative order:
The distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
proceedings has sometimes been predicated upon procedural differ-
ences. Quasi-judicial proceedings require notice, hearing, and the
opportunity for introduction of evidence. . . . Quasi-legislative
proceedings do not. More frequently, however, courts have exam-
ined the nature of the proceedings themselves, to ascertain whether
they involve the making or revising of rules, rather than the applica-
tion of rules in an adjudicatory manner.8
Thus, some thirty-three years after the decision in Zangerle, the court
had not yet clearly delineated those orders subject to appellate review
under Zangerle and Fortner. Not only did it fail to clarify the quasi-
legislative, quasi-judicial distinction, but it also failed to address the
persuasive arguments of appellants that this distinction should be
wholly abandoned in favor of the exercise of legislatively conferred
jurisdiction over justiciable challenges to all administrative orders.
7 42 Ohio St. 2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975).
At issue in Rankin-Thoman were regulations adopted by the State Fire Marshall setting
forth the state fire code. These regulations included provisions concerning mandatory fire
warning systems in all household dwellings of more than one unit. The appellant in American
Electric challenged regulations governing reclamation of strip-mined land.
11 42 Ohio St. 2d at 438, 329 N.E.2d at 688.
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B. Union Camp Corp. v. Whitman
Rankin-Thoman represents no retreat from Zangerle and
Fortner; but a rule-making appeal decided the same day suggests a
way to avoid the major tenet of those cases. In Union Camp Corp.
v. Whitman,"2 the Director of Environmental Protection had adopted
and modified regulations which governed the permissible levels of
pollution from stationary sources of air contaminants. Union Camp
appealed the rule-making order to the Environmental Board of Re-
view, 83 and then appealed the order of the Board to the court of
appeals pursuant to Revised Code § 3745.06.84 The appellate court
dismissed, citing Fortner, because of the quasi-legislative nature of
the Director's action. The supreme court reversed, remanding the
case to the court of appeals.
Union Camp presented the supreme court with the first rule-
making appeal in which the initial judicial appellate tribunal was
neither a court of common pleas nor the supreme court. The signifi-
cance of this distinction becomes clear upon examination of article
IV, § 3(B)(2) of the Ohio constitution: "Courts of appeals shall have
• . . such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review
and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administra-
tive officers or agencies." Lacking is the term "proceedings," which
Zangerle and Fortner held limited the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court and of the courts of common pleas to review of quasi-
judicial administrative orders.
The court did not reach the question of whether appellate review
of a rulemaking order is proper in the court of appeals. Rather, it
viewed the issue before it more narrowly: regardless of whether appel-
late review is otherwise proper or improper, is the court of appeals
precluded by Fortner from reviewing a quasi-legislative administra-
tive order?5 In finding Fortner inapplicable, the court relied primar-
42 Ohio St. 2d 441, 329 N.E.2d 690 (1975).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.04 (Page Supp. 1975) provides that "actions" of the
Director of Environmental Protection, including the "adoption, modification, or repeal of a
regulation," are to be appealed to the Environmental Board of Review, which has "exclusive
original jurisdiction." Thus Revised Code § 119.11, which provides for appeal of state agency
rule making to the court of common pleas, is inapplicable to the Ohio Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.
' OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 3745.06 provides in pertinent part:
Any party adversely affected by an order of the environmental board of review
may appeal to the court of appeals of Franklin county, or, if the appeal arises from
an alleged violation of the law or regulation, to the court of appeals or the district
in which the violation was alleged to have occurred.
" Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court responded to the argument of Union
Camp that the order appealed was not the Director's rule-making order, but a preliminary
procedural order of the Environmental Board of Review, thus rendering Fortner inapplicable.
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ily upon the absence of the term "proceedings" in the constitutional
definition of the jurisdiction of courts of appeals.
The holding in Fortner, however, was based upon more than the
quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial distinction, and included the notion
that all rule-making appeals fail to present justiciable questions. Yet
the court in Union Camp suggested a retreat from that position.
First, in a footnote, it strongly implied for the first time that the
premise set forth in the second syllabus in Fortner-that all rule-
making appeals are per se nonjusticiable-is not wholly separate
from the jurisdictional limitation drawn from the word "proceed-
ings" in the constitution.
This paragraph of the Fortner syllabus is a direct quote from
the fifth paragraph of the syllabus in Zangerle. It should be recalled
that Zangerle concerned an appeal to this court, Fortner involved
an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, and both cases turned
upon the same constitutional phraseology."
Indeed, if the per se nonjusticiability standard developed in both cases
turned upon the word "proceedings"-a conclusion nowhere sug-
gested in Zangerle and Fortner-Union Camp represents a signifi-
cant shift in the court's prior position.
The second indication of the court's movement away from the
position that all rule-making appeals ipso facto fail to present justici-
able questions is found in the following language:
The second paragraph of the Fortner syllabus sets forth a gen-
eral statement of familiar judicial doctrine. It should not be taken
as a sweeping eradication of the protection against significant bu-
reaucratic abuse which is derived from judicial scrutiny of the activi-
ties of regulatory agencies. For example, see the syllabus in Burger
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., supra."
Most significant in this passage is the reference to the decision in
Burger Brewing, in which the court found justiciable questions pre-
sented on the face of regulations with which regulated parties must
immediately comply. This strongly suggests an equation of an ap-
pellate proceeding in the court of appeals with an action in declara-
tory judgment, and consequently that justiciability is to be deter-
mined upon the facts of each case rather than denied by an irrebut-
table presumption of nonjusticiability in all rule-making appeals.
In remanding the case to the court of appeals, the court qualified
its intimation of approval of appellate review of rule making in the
42 Ohio St. 2d at 445 n.5, 329 N.E.2d at 692 n.5.
Id. at 444-45, 329 N.E.2d at 692.
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 471 (1976)
court of appeals. It noted that while Fortner did not compel dismissal
of the appeal, dismissal may have been proper on another ground:
In the instant case, pregnant statutory language found in R.C.
Chapter 3745 remains to be interpreted (at a time when it is
properly before us), and the effect of Section 3(B)(2) of Article IV
of the Constitution of Ohio upon the new statutes must be deter-
mined (which was not done below by virtue of the dismissal). We
cannot properly settle these issues upon the record herein, except
to announce our conclusion, necessary to a resolution of this ap-
peal, that nothing in the decisions thus far announced by this
court mandates the result reached by the Court of Appeals."8
Thus the court simultaneously hints of future disapproval of rule-
making appeals to the courts of appeals, yet concludes that it would
have to do so on a basis other than those developed "in decisions thus
far announced by this court."
C. In re Appeal of Buckeye Power, Inc.
Union Camp indicates that the courts of appeals might be used
for rule-making appeals. A decision rendered only two weeks later,
however, indicates that such appeals must be carefully limited. In re
Appeal of Buckeye Power, Inc.,8" presented the supreme court with
an appeal taen directly to it from the adoption of regulations by the
Power Siting Commission." The appellant electric utility companies
contended that the regulations exceeded the authority granted the
Commission in its organic statutes." The court sua sponte dismissed
the appeal without mention of a limitation of its appellate jurisdiction
to quasi-judicial, non-rule-making administrative orders.12 Rather, it
dealt solely with justiciability, noting that the appellants' challenge
was not to the regulations as applied in a specific case. The court's
apparent reassertion of the doctrine that rule-making appeals fail to
present justiciable questions seems anomalous in light of the language
of Union Camp that review of rule-making appeals in the court of
appeals is not precluded by previous supreme court decisions. Surely,
the supreme court is no more limited in deciding justiciable questions
1I Id. at 445, 329 N.E.2d at 692.
" 42 Ohio St. 2d 508, 330 N.E.2d 430 (1975).
The provision for direct appeal to the supreme court is found in Onto RV. Coia ANN.
§ 4903.12 (Page 1954): "No court other than the supreme court shall have the power to review,
suspend, or delay any order made [by the Power Siting Commission] .... .
" Ofio REV. CODE ANN. ,§ 4906.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1975).
Noting the single ground invoked in the majority opinion, three justices in a concurring
opinion reminded the majority of the jurisdictional issue set forth in Zangerle as a separate
basis for the dismissal. 42 Ohio St. 2d 510, 330 N.E.2d at 431.
RULEMAKING REVIEW
than are the courts of appeals. Thus it is not clear whether the court
in Buckeye Power determined from the record before it that justicia-
ble questions were not presented or held that all rule-making appeals
as a matter of law fail to present justiciable questions.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the crack in the barrier
against rule-making appeals opened in Union Camp has not been
resealed by Buckeye Power. Union Camp's retreat from an all-
encompassing justiciability preclusion rests upon reference to Burger
Brewing, in which the court held that the adoption of regulations
immediately binding upon regulated parties presents justiciable ques-
tions. Buckeye Power can be viewed as consistent with this justiciabil-
ity standard, for the Power Siting Commission's purpose is to certify
that new utility facilities are needed to maintain service and that such
facilities have the minimum adverse impact on the environment.13
Because the Commission does not regulate the present operations of
the appellant utilities, a concrete interest on their part in challenging
the regulations would arise only upon an application for certification
of a new facility. In this sense, the utilities were not placed in the
dilemma discussed in Burger Brewing, in which the regulated parties
were asked to comply immediately with regulations against which
they had no adequate vehicle for challenge.
While Union Camp and Buckeye Power do not represent an
explicit reevaluation of the Zangerle and Fortner holdings, they do
demonstrate sufficient conceptual fluidity to warrant the conclusion
that the court, in proper circumstances, would approve judicial appel-
late review of administrative rule making. To improve the potential
for judicial approval, statutes providing for direct review must be
carefully drafted to be as consistent as possible with the existing case
authority.
VI. A CONCEPTUAL PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
It is difficult to accurately predict the circumstances in which the
Ohio Supreme Court would permit judicial appellate review of ad-
ministrative rule making. Almost any proposal for legislative reform
arguably would conflict with language found in one or more of the
court's decisions. It is submitted, however, that the advantages of
direct appeal over actions in declaratory judgment, and the indica-
tions in Burger Brewing, Union Camp, and Buckeye Power that the
court may be receptive to direct appellate review, warrant an attempt
to create an acceptable appellate remedy by legislation.
"' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10 (Page Supp. 1975).
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Prior decisions indicate two principal hurdles to appellate review
of rule making. The first-limitation of appellate jurisdiction of the
courts of common pleas and the supreme court to review of quasi-
judicial orders- can presumably be overcome by providing that judi-
cial review originate in the court of appeals, to which such limitation
does not apply." In order to avoid the possibility of conflicting deci-
sions, and to encourage the development of a court with expertise in
administrative law, appeals should be directed to one appellate dis-
trict, preferably the Tenth District encompassing Franklin County.
A more formidable obstacle to approval of appellate review of
administrative rule making is the court's view that the act of rule
making does not present justiciable questions on appeal. Yet in
Burger Brewing the court viewed actions in declaratory judgment as
presenting justiciable questions for review. This demonstrates that
justiciable questions may arise as part of challenges to regulations in
contexts other than quasi-judicial administrative proceedings. Thus
direct appellate challenges to regulations may be approved by the
court if the statutes creating this remedy incorporate the primary
teaching of Burger Brewing-that the appellant must demonstrate a
justiciable challenge to the regulations. Such statutes should contain
a standing requirement and should provide for judicial discretion to
assess the hardship to the appellant if pre-enforcement relief is
denied, as well as to determine whether speedy relief is necessary to
preserve the rights of the appellant.
The issues cognizable in such an appeal must be carefully lim-
ited. A distinction should be drawn between challenges to the facial
and procedural validity of a regulation and challenges to the pro-
priety of the regulation as applied to an individual regulatee.15 Facial
issues can be promptly decided in an appeal from the adoption of the
regulation solely on the basis of the rule-making record: issues arising
from specific applications of the regulation should await review on
11 See section V supra. A question may arise as to the jurisdiction of the supreme court
to review decisions of the court of appeals in rule-making appeals, in light of the holding in
Zangerle limiting the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review of non-rule-making adminis-
trative orders. It is inconceivable, however, that the supreme court would decline on the basis
of Zangerle to review these appellate decisions. The court could base review upon its general
jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of appeals. OHIO CONST. art. IV, §4 2(B)(2)(a)(iii).
(d).
" Statutes creating an appellate remedy should require such a showing to be made to the
agency as part of rule-making proceedings. For example, Revised Code § 119.03 requires
publication of proposed regulations, a public hearing, and receipt of written comments on the
proposals. The prospective appellant can make his showing of immediate adverse impact of
the proposed regulations as part of these proceedings, which becomes a part (f the record on
appeal.
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the basis of a record developed in an adjudicatory proceeding."
Finally, statutes providing for direct appeal should specify a
period of time after promulgation of the regulation within which the
appeal must be perfected.97 The very purpose of a direct appellate
remedy is to provide prompt judicial determination, on the basis of
the record developed before the administrative agency, of the facial
validity of a rule-making action. A proper record of the rule-making
proceeding will contain not only the agency's justification for its
proposed regulation, but also the positions, arguments, and evidence
of proponents and opponents of the proposal. Prompt appeal insures
timely review of challenges to the regulation upon a record which has
not become stale, but rather accurately reflects the parties' current
position in opposition to, and support of, the rule-making action.
Moreover, such an appeal by its very nature involves generic issues
affecting subsequent application of the regulation, and should be
promptly commenced and decided. Prompt notification of the perfec-
tion of the appeal permits the agency to determine how, if at all, the
regulation should be implemented pending the court's decisioi.'
The appellate remedy described above is not certain to obtain the
supreme court's approval. However, it provides the prompt relief
which the court in Burger Brewing recognized as necessary to protect
regulated parties, and is far preferable to an action in declaratory
judgment. Furthermore, deferral to appeals from quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings of issues requiring reference to an adjudicatory record pro-
tects the appellate courts from deciding such matters in the absence
of an appropriate factual record developed in an adversary proceed-
ing.
" At least one Ohio court has recognized that a distinction may be drawn between generic
issues subject to resolution on the basis of a rule-making record and issues that require reference
to a record demonstrating specific application of the regulation. Battles v. Ohio State Racing
Comm., 12 Ohio App. 2d 52, 230 N.E.2d 662 (1967). This distinction is not sharply defined.
and would require case-by-case development of the issues cognizable in a rule-making appeal.
However, this distinction is central to an appellate remedy from administrative rule making
and easily justifies an expenditure of judicial energy to sharpen its contours.
" A matter deserving greater study is whether one who foregoes appellate review thereby
waives his right to raise issues cognizable on appeal in a later proceeding, e.g.. as part of an
action to enforce the regulation. Were certainty the only criterion, waiver should be invoked
to assure the agency that if no appeal is taken from promulgation the regulation is thereafter
immune from facial attack.
" OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1969), which was struck down in Fortner,
included the harsh provision that a perfected appeal postponed the effective date of the regula-
tion pending the court's decision. Id. It would be preferable either to provide for automatic
suspension only as applied to the appellant, or to provide the court with authority to suspend
the regulation upon proper motion, in a manner analogous to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
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A statute providing for direct appeal Would be of sufficient value
to merit enactment. It would allow appellate review of administrative
rule making on the basis of an appropriate record and in a context
which ensures the presence of adverse parties seeking to litigate justi-
ciable questions. Legislative and judicial endorsement of such a stat-
ute would constitute a significant advance in Ohio administrative law.
